Synthetic a priori judgments
David Hume thought there are two categories of knowledge; knowledge that is independent of experience which tell us nothing about the world, and knowledge that is derived from experience. Immanuel Kant came to the conclusion there is another kind of knowledge independent of experience that can tell us something about the world. This kind of knowledge falls under what he calls synthetic a priori. To understand synthetic a priori, some distinction must be made.
The first distinction is between a priori and a posteriori. Knowledge that is independent of experience is a priori, universal, and is a necessary truth. They are universal by being true everywhere and at the same time, and necessary true by being logically impossible in being false. A posteriori knowledge is gained from experience, and is always open to revision; such knowledge would be, “all dogs have two eyes.” This is revisable since we don’t have omniscient knowledge of the world; it is possible a dog is discovered (experienced) that has three eyes. The next distinction is between different thought processes; that is, analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments which the subject contains the predicate; the definition of the subject is defined in the sentence. Such as, “all bachelors are unmarried.” The subject “bachelor” contains the predicate, “are unmarried”. Analytic judgments are necessary truths, but they tell us nothing about things independent of them, they tell us nothing about the world. Judgments that tell us something independent of the subject are synthetic; such as, “all bachelors are bald,” here the statement gives information that is not contained in the idea of a bachelor. “All bachelors are bald” can also be said negatively as “no bachelors are bald,” without a self-contradiction. This can’t be done with “all bachelors are unmarried,” as “no bachelors are unmarried,” which is a self-contradiction. Hume considered a priori and analytic statements as inseparatable, as well as a posteriori and synthetic statements. That is, they were considered so closely linked that the idea of one of them would include the idea of the other. The idea of an analytic judgment must be a priori because the truth of it does not depend on experience. Similarly, a posteriori and synthetic statements seemed inseparatable since useful information is only provided by experience. But Kant argued for the category of synthetic a priori judgments.
Kant gives the example of, “12 = 5 + 7,” as “12” does not contain the predicate of “five plus seven.” This is an example of synthetic a priori judgment since it is necessary, universal, independent of experience, and gives information that is not defined in the subject “12”. Drawing from this point, Kant says we can derive necessary, and universal truths about the world from certain concepts. “Every event has a cause” is synthetic as the negation, “no event has a cause” is not self-contradictory; it is also universal and necessary and so falls under a priori. If Kant is correct, he has discovered a new way to gain information about the world.
Although Kant’s argument is persuasive, I am not convince of the example, “12=5+7” as a synthetic a priori judgment. It seems to me this is an analytic judgment; if “12” is broken down as twelve “1’s”, and same is done for “5” and “7”, there is basically twelve 1’s equaling twelve 1’s (12=12). So it seems, “5 +7” does contain the idea of 12, which makes it analytic.
Thursday, December 18, 2008
Justified: future events similar to past events
We usually expect future events to be similar to past events. We expect the sun to rise tomorrow as we have experienced this before. But David Hume recognized that past events tell us nothing about the future unless it is assumed the world is uniform.
Hume says there is knowledge of relation of Ideas and knowledge the world. Relations of ideas are necessary, that is they cannot be any other way. All triangles have three
sides is a relation of ideas and for a triangle to be any other way (having four sides) would result in a contradiction. New Mexico is in the United States is knowledge of fact, and to deny this does not result in a contradiction. A triangle having three sides can be known independently of the world, but to know New Mexico is in the United States requires experience of the world. From his view of knowledge, Hume thinks the idea of cause and effect is based on experience of the world because a certain cause does not necessitate an effect.
Hume argues for a belief to be justified there must be reasons to support it. The justification for knowing New Mexico is in the United States may be; referring to a reliable map, experiencing the place first hand, or hearing about it from a reliable source, etc. Hume thinks there is no justification for future events being similar to past events. What is Jones’s reason for believing ball B will move when ball A strikes it? The response may be, I have experienced these things in the past and so can expect them in the future, but this assumes there is uniformity in the world that links causes of past events to be similar to future events. Jones assumes what he is trying to reason for.
This is a problem that has enormous consequences in how the world is viewed. Even if we have experienced the apparent effect of an event a thousand times we are not justified in believing a similar event will occur again; even the probability of a similar event is not justified. A scientist who has observed water freezing at a certain temperature, numerous times, has no reason to expect it will happen again under the same conditions. An effect of a cause can have any result because there is no contradiction in thinking otherwise since it is not necessary. We have no more reason the sun will rise tomorrow as usual, over it being purple, or not at all. As Hume does not think this problem can be resolved he gives an explanation of why he thinks past events will resemble the future.
Hume says humans have the nature of normally or routinely behaving similar to what we have experienced and calls our attention to the learning of children and animals as examples. Hume says, “Animals… are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children.” (Hume, 382) Children do not conclude a justification for why they should drink what is nourishing for them, they do it naturally. There are reasons why this view is conducive for life; if a child needed justification for why it should eat, it would not eat because it does not have the rational capability to form a justification. Nature has programmed us to expect the world to be a certain way, and as a result we avoid destructive events and form beliefs based on experience.
As for the lack of just of justification for the belief that future events will be like the past seems inescapable.
David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 210.
Hume says there is knowledge of relation of Ideas and knowledge the world. Relations of ideas are necessary, that is they cannot be any other way. All triangles have three
sides is a relation of ideas and for a triangle to be any other way (having four sides) would result in a contradiction. New Mexico is in the United States is knowledge of fact, and to deny this does not result in a contradiction. A triangle having three sides can be known independently of the world, but to know New Mexico is in the United States requires experience of the world. From his view of knowledge, Hume thinks the idea of cause and effect is based on experience of the world because a certain cause does not necessitate an effect.
Hume argues for a belief to be justified there must be reasons to support it. The justification for knowing New Mexico is in the United States may be; referring to a reliable map, experiencing the place first hand, or hearing about it from a reliable source, etc. Hume thinks there is no justification for future events being similar to past events. What is Jones’s reason for believing ball B will move when ball A strikes it? The response may be, I have experienced these things in the past and so can expect them in the future, but this assumes there is uniformity in the world that links causes of past events to be similar to future events. Jones assumes what he is trying to reason for.
This is a problem that has enormous consequences in how the world is viewed. Even if we have experienced the apparent effect of an event a thousand times we are not justified in believing a similar event will occur again; even the probability of a similar event is not justified. A scientist who has observed water freezing at a certain temperature, numerous times, has no reason to expect it will happen again under the same conditions. An effect of a cause can have any result because there is no contradiction in thinking otherwise since it is not necessary. We have no more reason the sun will rise tomorrow as usual, over it being purple, or not at all. As Hume does not think this problem can be resolved he gives an explanation of why he thinks past events will resemble the future.
Hume says humans have the nature of normally or routinely behaving similar to what we have experienced and calls our attention to the learning of children and animals as examples. Hume says, “Animals… are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children.” (Hume, 382) Children do not conclude a justification for why they should drink what is nourishing for them, they do it naturally. There are reasons why this view is conducive for life; if a child needed justification for why it should eat, it would not eat because it does not have the rational capability to form a justification. Nature has programmed us to expect the world to be a certain way, and as a result we avoid destructive events and form beliefs based on experience.
As for the lack of just of justification for the belief that future events will be like the past seems inescapable.
David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), p. 210.
Sunday, December 14, 2008
Descartes’ Myth
In 1949 Gilbert Ryle published a challenge to what he considered to be the official theory of mind-body separation. He describes the mind-body distinction as the mind existing apart from the physical world and the body existing in the world, and a person consists of both of these attributes. A mind is sometimes described as being in the head of a person, but this is only used metaphorically; it is not a spatial object. A mind is also private to the individual. So unless Daniela’s mind is expressed, only Daniela can know her thoughts, feelings, etc.
The mind can cause a change in the physical world and the world can cause a change in the mind. So a person’s mind can cause the body to reach out and grab a pen. And what a person touches, smells, sees, etc, with the body causes an effect on the mind.
Ryle thinks this view of separation of body and mind is ridiculous and refers to it as, “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.” He begins the argument against this view in his attempt to show that it is a categorical mistake. A categorical mistake can arise when a person does not recognize an entity, and only recognizes the parts. Ryle gives the example of person being given a tour of a university; and after the person saw the university for the first time he asks the question, I have seen the students, buildings, and different colleges, but where is the university? The person thought the parts of the university were separate from the university. A less likely, but same mistake could occur if someone asked a friend to see pictures of their family, and when done showing the pictures of their, cousin, uncle, brother, mother, and father; the person replies, “so which one of these people is your family?” The mistake arise by not understand a concept of the language. There are also theoretical categorical mistakes. As Ryle says, a person may become confused when they here about John Dow, and wonders, “where is this John Dow, why have I never seen him”? The person makes the mistake of thinking that there is really a particular person being referred as John Dow, instead of recognizing that John Dow is the average people who pay taxes. The person would consider John Dow as a ghost that is everywhere, but nowhere to be found. This understanding of categorical mistake begins the argument against distinction of the mind and body for Ryle .
Ryle believes the categorical mistake of the mind and body arose during maturity of science. From science, people began to understand the world as more mechanical and predictable as they understood there were laws that governed its nature. As a scientist, Renee Descartes saw this and sought to distinguish physics from mind on religious motivations. Ryle describes the idea having been formed in negatives; The mind is not, matter, mechanical, in space, or is accessible to public observation. And because it was also assumed the physical world is determined, it was assumed that moral values could no longer be applicable. If there are physical laws that determine everything, the question arose; how can any person be morally responsible for their choices if they are fully mechanical beings? That is, one could no more blame a tree for falling on someone then being slapped by someone in the face.
Ryle thinks it was too quickly assumed that the mind and body were separate. By doing so, it does not allow for the opportunity to consider other ideas of how body and mind are correlated. It does not allow for alternative view of how physical states affect mental states. He says we were able to distinguish “good from bad arithmetic, politic from impolitic conduct” long before Descartes and continue to do so.
When considering two conflicting propositions, Ryle thinks that before an entire new category is assumed to mitigate a problem, it should first be attempted to resolve it as is. If someone wanted to understand the difference between men and women it would be odd to create a new category of existence for men, such as non-humanoid. Rather one should consider how they are related, and would come to the conclusion they both fall in the category of human. Ryle gives the example from a person buying a pair of gloves, and says it would be an error to say that the person bought a right handed glove or a left handed glove, but not both. Example of things that should be considered in different categories are color, sunset, dogs, and smiles.
Although Ryle gives several examples of categorical mistakes, I am left wondering what exactly is the criterion of a categorical mistake. If there are two independent objects such as; “red balls,” and “blue balls,” it is possible to place the red and blue objects in separate color categories. But we could also place the different colored objects in the same category, such “toys”. If the criterion for a categorical mistake is not clear, it is difficult to see if the argument is conclusive.
The mind can cause a change in the physical world and the world can cause a change in the mind. So a person’s mind can cause the body to reach out and grab a pen. And what a person touches, smells, sees, etc, with the body causes an effect on the mind.
Ryle thinks this view of separation of body and mind is ridiculous and refers to it as, “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.” He begins the argument against this view in his attempt to show that it is a categorical mistake. A categorical mistake can arise when a person does not recognize an entity, and only recognizes the parts. Ryle gives the example of person being given a tour of a university; and after the person saw the university for the first time he asks the question, I have seen the students, buildings, and different colleges, but where is the university? The person thought the parts of the university were separate from the university. A less likely, but same mistake could occur if someone asked a friend to see pictures of their family, and when done showing the pictures of their, cousin, uncle, brother, mother, and father; the person replies, “so which one of these people is your family?” The mistake arise by not understand a concept of the language. There are also theoretical categorical mistakes. As Ryle says, a person may become confused when they here about John Dow, and wonders, “where is this John Dow, why have I never seen him”? The person makes the mistake of thinking that there is really a particular person being referred as John Dow, instead of recognizing that John Dow is the average people who pay taxes. The person would consider John Dow as a ghost that is everywhere, but nowhere to be found. This understanding of categorical mistake begins the argument against distinction of the mind and body for Ryle .
Ryle believes the categorical mistake of the mind and body arose during maturity of science. From science, people began to understand the world as more mechanical and predictable as they understood there were laws that governed its nature. As a scientist, Renee Descartes saw this and sought to distinguish physics from mind on religious motivations. Ryle describes the idea having been formed in negatives; The mind is not, matter, mechanical, in space, or is accessible to public observation. And because it was also assumed the physical world is determined, it was assumed that moral values could no longer be applicable. If there are physical laws that determine everything, the question arose; how can any person be morally responsible for their choices if they are fully mechanical beings? That is, one could no more blame a tree for falling on someone then being slapped by someone in the face.
Ryle thinks it was too quickly assumed that the mind and body were separate. By doing so, it does not allow for the opportunity to consider other ideas of how body and mind are correlated. It does not allow for alternative view of how physical states affect mental states. He says we were able to distinguish “good from bad arithmetic, politic from impolitic conduct” long before Descartes and continue to do so.
When considering two conflicting propositions, Ryle thinks that before an entire new category is assumed to mitigate a problem, it should first be attempted to resolve it as is. If someone wanted to understand the difference between men and women it would be odd to create a new category of existence for men, such as non-humanoid. Rather one should consider how they are related, and would come to the conclusion they both fall in the category of human. Ryle gives the example from a person buying a pair of gloves, and says it would be an error to say that the person bought a right handed glove or a left handed glove, but not both. Example of things that should be considered in different categories are color, sunset, dogs, and smiles.
Although Ryle gives several examples of categorical mistakes, I am left wondering what exactly is the criterion of a categorical mistake. If there are two independent objects such as; “red balls,” and “blue balls,” it is possible to place the red and blue objects in separate color categories. But we could also place the different colored objects in the same category, such “toys”. If the criterion for a categorical mistake is not clear, it is difficult to see if the argument is conclusive.
Berkeley on Ideas
George Berkeley holds that material things do not exist and that everything we experience are ideas. Two of the goals for this argument are to avoid materialism, which he thought led to Atheism, and to get rid of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
John Locke thinks primary qualities are mind-independent material things with extension, shape, motion; a cube is an example. Secondary qualities are mind-dependant things as color, sound, smell, and taste; that is, taste is not in the apple but in experience. But Berkeley says this distinction should not be made, as primary and secondary qualities cannot be conceived independently. Shape and color cannot be conceived independently, that is a cube cannot be conceived if it is colorless. How can Jones see a cube if it has no color? This means that to speak of material objects is meaningless as all objects are now mind dependant.
Berkeley says, for something to exist it must be perceived. Only a mind can perceive things and if something is not perceived we have no reason to believe it exists. For a table to exist it must be perceived; it must be seen, felt, or smelled, etc. So would Berkeley have Jones believe a table in a room only exists as only as long as Jones is looking at it? Berkeley says no because even if a person no longer perceives the table God perceives all things, and so we still have reason to believe it exists.
The claim that material things do not exist and are ideas, relies on the truth of two statements; the first is things such as cars, apples, tables, etc is perceived by sense. The second is something perceived by sense are ideas, so he concludes all things are ideas. If someone disagrees with the first statement, Berkeley says they must give an example of an object that is not sensed, if they cannot, the first statement stands. If someone disagrees with the second statement they would have to give an example of an object that does not rely on secondary qualities.
Berkeley also offers his master argument that is supposed to ground his view of a world of mind dependant objects. He asks if there is anything that can be conceived but is not perceived? Jones may imagine a table in a room that is unperceived, but Jones is imagining this scene, so it is still not mind independent. So if we can’t conceive of objects independent of the mind then we can’t and will not be able to experience them.
There are ideas that we can experience caused by God and there are ideas caused by Jones that can be only experienced by Jones. But if everything we experience are ideas how can Jones tell the difference between his ideas and ideas independent of him? Berkeley gives several reason of why he is sure this is not a problem. Ideas independent of Jones are caused by God and are distinguished by being orderly, coherent, and vivid. These things are characteristic of the world apart from our minds. Whereas our ideas are constantly fluctuating from one thought to another the world is supposed far more orderly. Coherency involves consistency in the world we experience, if Jones touched ice he would think it strange if it were hot. And the world is vivid with complexity and distinct objects that are difficult to imagine. These characteristics are supposed to distinguish our ideas and dreams from the external world.
Although Berkeley’s criteria for distinguishing objects from our mind from objects of the world usually works, it does not always seem to be the case. Berkeley seems to assume all people have a similar psychological makeup as his own, but I can imagine a person who has better imagination, vividness, and coherency than the world. I have experienced objects in dreams that are more vivid than similar objects in the world. People hallucinating describe objects as being more distinct and vivid. And sometimes the world is not as coherent as we suppose it to be, such an example is the world composed particles and waves, two seemingly inconsistent ideas; this is something one may accept in a dream but not in the supposed coherent world. As Berkeley seemed very sure we could distinguish independent and dependant ideas it seems this is not always the case.
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